Daily Papers

We introduce a new predator-prey model by replacing the growth and predation constant by a square matrix, and the population density as a population vector. The classical Lotka-Volterra model describes a population that either modulates or converges. Stability analysis of such models have been extensively studied by the works of Merdan (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2007.06.062). The new model adds complexity by introducing an age group structure where the population of each age group evolves as prescribed by the Leslie matrix. The added complexity changes the behavior of the model such that the population either displays roughly an exponential growth or decay. We first provide an exact equation that describes a time evolution and use analytic techniques to obtain an approximate growth factor. We also discuss the variants of the Leslie model, i.e., the complex value predator-prey model and the competitive model. We then prove the Last Species Standing theorem that determines the dominant population in the large time limit. The recursive structure of the model denies the application of simple regression. We discuss a machine learning scheme that allows an admissible fit for the population evolution of Paramecium Aurelia and Paramecium Caudatum. Another potential avenue to simplify the computation is to use the machinery of quantum operators. We demonstrate the potential of this approach by computing the Hamiltonian of a simple Leslie system.

Camouflaged object detection (COD) is the challenging task of identifying camouflaged objects visually blended into surroundings. Albeit achieving remarkable success, existing COD detectors still struggle to obtain precise results in some challenging cases. To handle this problem, we draw inspiration from the prey-vs-predator game that leads preys to develop better camouflage and predators to acquire more acute vision systems and develop algorithms from both the prey side and the predator side. On the prey side, we propose an adversarial training framework, Camouflageator, which introduces an auxiliary generator to generate more camouflaged objects that are harder for a COD method to detect. Camouflageator trains the generator and detector in an adversarial way such that the enhanced auxiliary generator helps produce a stronger detector. On the predator side, we introduce a novel COD method, called Internal Coherence and Edge Guidance (ICEG), which introduces a camouflaged feature coherence module to excavate the internal coherence of camouflaged objects, striving to obtain more complete segmentation results. Additionally, ICEG proposes a novel edge-guided separated calibration module to remove false predictions to avoid obtaining ambiguous boundaries. Extensive experiments show that ICEG outperforms existing COD detectors and Camouflageator is flexible to improve various COD detectors, including ICEG, which brings state-of-the-art COD performance.

This paper identifies and analyzes a novel vulnerability class in Model Context Protocol (MCP) based agent systems. The attack chain describes and demonstrates how benign, individually authorized tasks can be orchestrated to produce harmful emergent behaviors. Through systematic analysis using the MITRE ATLAS framework, we demonstrate how 95 agents tested with access to multiple services-including browser automation, financial analysis, location tracking, and code deployment-can chain legitimate operations into sophisticated attack sequences that extend beyond the security boundaries of any individual service. These red team exercises survey whether current MCP architectures lack cross-domain security measures necessary to detect or prevent a large category of compositional attacks. We present empirical evidence of specific attack chains that achieve targeted harm through service orchestration, including data exfiltration, financial manipulation, and infrastructure compromise. These findings reveal that the fundamental security assumption of service isolation fails when agents can coordinate actions across multiple domains, creating an exponential attack surface that grows with each additional capability. This research provides a barebones experimental framework that evaluate not whether agents can complete MCP benchmark tasks, but what happens when they complete them too well and optimize across multiple services in ways that violate human expectations and safety constraints. We propose three concrete experimental directions using the existing MCP benchmark suite.